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Abstract: 
Policy forums are issue-based intermediary organizations where diverse types of political and 
societal actors repeatedly interact. Policy forums are important elements of modern 
governance systems as they allow actors to learn, negotiate, or build trust. They can vary in 
composition, size, membership logic, and other distinct features. This article lays the 
foundation of a theory of policy forums based on three interrelated elements: First, it 
discusses conditions for the formation of a forum and describes the logic of these 
organizations as one of an asymmetric multipartite exchange. Second, it enumerates the 
potential set of goals and motivations of participating actors that are fed into this exchange. 
Third, it proposes eight different dimensions on which policy forums differ and which affect 
the exchange mechanisms among actors. We claim that empirical work on policy forums 
should systematically take these elements into account and propose elements of a research 
agenda. 
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Introduction 
Since the decline of hierarchical decision making and the emergence of networks as a “new 
form of [political] governance” some 30 years ago (Powell 1990; Börzel 1998; Hajer 2003), 
manifold types of policy forums have emerged in the political landscape. Against the 
increasing complexity and fragmentation of public policy making, policy forums are supposed 
to facilitate the coordination among authorities, interest groups, or scientific experts. By 
providing a space for interaction, policy forums aim for horizontal, rather than vertical, 
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integration (Bogason and Musso 2006). This is especially important for dealing with policy 
issues characterized by scientific complexity and uncertainty (Gollier and 
Treich 2003; Lubell 2013) or spanning multiple traditional policy subsystems (Hoberg and 
Morawski 2008; Jones and Jenkins-Smith 2009). Prime examples are policy forums on topics 
like water, energy, public health issues, or sustainable development.  
Subforms of policy forums have been described in various branches of literature, namely 
on collaborative, adaptive or polycentric governance and collective action theory, regulatory 
governance, deliberation, corporatism, epistemic communities, venue shopping, the ecology 
of games, science and technology studies, policy advice, transaction cost politics, and 
resource dependence theory. Besides “policy forum” (Kinzig and Starrett 2003), the literature 
uses various overlapping concepts like “boundary organization” (Guston 2001), “bridging 
organization” (Hahn et al. 2006), “intermediary organization” (Braun 1993), “policy 
committee” (Leifeld and Schneider 2012), “collaborative institution” (Lubell 2004), “game” 
(Lubell 2010), “advisory group” (Agrawala 1999; Parkins 2002), “advisory committee” 
(Vasseur et al. 1997), “working group” (Klijn et al. 1995), “multi-organizational boards” 
(Klijn and Skelcher 2007), “partnerships” (Selsky and Parker 2005), and “roundtable” (Jamal 
and Getz 1999; Turcotte and Pasquero 2001).1 It is currently unclear how these different 
concepts relate to each other. The goal of this article is not to provide a systematic literature 
review, but to lay the foundation of an integrated theory of policy forums by synthesizing 
these hitherto mostly separate but complementary branches of literature.  
More specifically, we ask how we can understand the existence and functioning of policy 
forums. Given that forums are created in a bottom-up manner by any type of actor, and actors 
are basically free to choose whether or not to participate in a forum, we rely on a rational-
choice institutionalist framework. This theoretical focus allows to understand actors’ 
participation in policy forums and the specific characteristics of forums as the outcome of 
individual considerations of actors with regard to their resources and needs. Our argument is 
based on three inter-related elements: First, we discuss the formation of policy forums based 
on the logic of an asymmetric multipartite exchange of resources among actors. Second, we 
enumerate the potential set of goals and motivations of participating actors that are fed into 
this exchange within the forum. Third, we propose several dimensions on which policy 
forums may differ and which relate to the exchange mechanisms among actors.  
Research on policy forums is highly relevant for political science and public 
administration, given the contrasting opinions about their role for democracy (Sörensen and 
Torfing 2005; Klijn and Skelcher 2007). On the one hand, policy forums have been accused 
of undermining democratic legitimacy and being ineffective tools of governance. Two main 
arguments have been put forth. First, policy makers have been elected to craft policies, and 
bureaucrats are paid well to formulate and implement them. If decisions are actually prepared 
in committees composed of members without an official mandate, this is a waste of resources 
but also a potential backdoor for advocacy. This “boardization” lacks transparency and 
accountability (Bogason and Musso 2006; Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Wilks 2007) and leads to 
“deparliamentarization”, a “democratic deficit”, or a “control gap” (Krick 2006). Second, 
deliberation in policy forums can lead to either of two extreme outcomes: expertocracy or 
technocracy, where experts dominate and bias policy making towards technical solutions 
(Busch 2009), and the use of policy forums by politicians or bureaucrats in order to legitimize 
their policies through scientific credibility (“policy-based evidence-making”, Busch 2009). 
On the other hand, the literature also discusses positive aspects of policy forums. It notably 
emphasizes civil society participation and the establishment of a “public sphere” as well as 
balanced decisions due to extensive deliberation (Rowe and Frewer 2000; 
                                                 
1 These concepts are all interchangeably called “policy forums” in the remainder of this article because we would 
like to provide a unified framework for their analysis. 
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Parkins 2002; Feldman and Khademian 2007; Klijn and Skelcher 2007). In addition to this 
increased input legitimacy, a higher “quality” of decisions can be expected due to the 
contribution of expert and stakeholder knowledge that is otherwise inaccessible to decision 
makers.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: The next section delineates the scope 
of policy forums and distinguishes them from similar types of organizations. Section 3 
suggests a framework for the analysis of policy forums based on rational-choice 
institutionalism and multipartite resource exchanges between participants. The next two 
sections analyze the phenomenon from two opposite sides: section 4 disentangles the various 
goals of the participants, and section 5 proposes a set of characteristics according to which 
policy forums can differ. The concluding section sums up the dimensions in which policy 
forums can be analyzed and suggests key items for a future research agenda on policy forums.  
 
2 Delineating policy forums 
As compared to other collaborative structures, policy forums have a number of distinct 
features: they have organizational boundaries between the forum and the outside issue 
network, give rise to repeated interaction, include diverse members without serving a single 
interest, and deal with political or societal issues. 
First, policy forums are all characterized by some form of organization beyond a mere 
network of actors dealing with an issue. There are clearly defined boundaries including 
members and regular participants whose membership is publicly disclaimed. The result is a 
special flavor of network governance, which is neither based on informal ties between actors 
only (as in the idea of “issue networks”, see Heclo 1978), nor close to “policy communities” 
with strict boundaries and preferential access to decision makers are imperative (Rhodes and 
Marsh 1992; van Waarden 1992). Policy forums can rather be understood as organized, stable 
arrangements situated in the larger network of actors, where resources are exchanged among 
members. Interactions between members of a policy forum and the outside world are 
common, yet the organizational boundary between members and non-members prevents non-
members from taking part in the interactions inside the forum. 
Second, policy forums are not merely one-shot conferences, but exert some stability over 
time, potentially on a permanent basis. For example, a policy forum on freshwater quality or 
on demographic challenges serves as a knowledge exchange or negotiation venue for political, 
scientific, and corporate members dealing with these issues. To be effective and satisfy actors’ 
goals, they interact on a regular basis. While one-shot conferences are possible, they do not 
belong to the distinct type of policy forum we are addressing here. They are rather events 
sponsored by organizations such as forums, and they do not act on their own vis-à-vis the 
outside world. 
Third, policy forums are not advocacy organizations for a specific interest. Policy forums 
can pursue broad interests that are acceptable to everyone, like “increasing the quality of 
decisions” or “discussing issues related to water”, but they do not act as partisan or advocacy 
organizations toward the outside world. This alleged neutrality distinguishes policy forums 
from similar types of organizations with more partial goal orientations, like recurring 
conferences of partisan actors, advocacy groups or think tanks. Quite a number of non-
governmental organizations carry the label “policy forum” although they have obvious policy 
goals and advocacy purposes.2 These organizations do not belong to the group of 
organizations we call policy forums. Rather, policy forums have diverse types of members, 
even from opposing camps, and can integrate politicians, local stakeholders, organized 
interests and scientific experts alike (Head 2008). This also distinguishes them from 
                                                 
2 An example is the Global Policy Forum with its advocacy for accountability and citizen participation. 
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organizations like economic peak associations or intergovernmental conferences, which 
usually have multiple but not diverse members.  
Fourth, policy forums deal with policy-related issues. This usually excludes repeated 
strategic meetings between firms. However, while a focus on policy-relevant issues is 
mandatory, government actors are not required to be the initiators of a forum; policy forums 
can well be established by firms or advocacy groups who invite other actors to participate. 
Moreover, policy forums do not necessarily focus on decision making; they can as well deal 
with other stages of the policy cycle, such as problem recognition (usually with a stronger 
expert component), implementation (usually with the involvement of practitioners), or policy 
formulation (often with a stronger involvement of organized interests). While policy forums 
center around specific political or societal issues, they are not part of the official decision 
making institutions of the government (neither bureaucracy nor parliament). This excludes 
parliaments or cabinets from the definition. 
Finally, the definition given above implies several delineations from other concepts: 
policy forums are a subset of policy venues—all policy forums may be called “venues”, but 
there are venues that do not qualify as forums, such as intergovernmental conferences 
(because they do not have diverse members) or open consultations (because they do not have 
clear organizational boundaries). Similarly, all policy forums can be called “institutions” 
because they have an organizational boundary, a time horizon that exceeds a single event, and 
they are based on explicit or implicit rules. There are however institutions such as a state 
constitution that do not have (diverse) members or organizational boundaries. 
Policy forums may have different types of internal rules. What they have in common is 
that their members coordinate exchanges of resources, such as knowledge, information, 
compliance, or ideas. The remainder of this article serves to interpret forums as instances of 
multipartite exchanges that are initiated as a function of the actors’ demand and supply of 
different types of resources. 
 
3 Multipartite exchange and resource dependence  
According to our definition, policy forums are founded in a bottom-up manner by any type of 
actors, and other actors are free to choose whether or not to participate in a forum. We 
therefore rely on actor-centered approaches such as rational-choice institutionalism (Hall and 
Taylor 1996) and the institutional collective action framework (Feiock 2013) to understand 
why policy forums exist.3 These approaches posit that political actors are generally goal-
oriented and (boundedly) rational. In order to participate, actors must recognize a relation 
between forum participation and a likely outcome, i.e., a certain probability that they can 
achieve their goals (Ansell and Gash 2008; Feiock and Scholz 2010). The expected gains 
from forum participation must be higher than the opportunity costs of not pursuing a 
competing activity plus the transaction costs implied by participation in the forum 
(Feiock 2013). Transaction costs are the time and resources to be invested in getting access to 
the forum, preparing for the meetings, and spending time in forum meetings. Additional 
forum-specific transaction costs are barriers that prevent actors from reaching coordinated 
                                                 
3 It may be possible to understand policy forums and participation of actors therein based on other theoretical 
premises. For example, sociological institutionalism would posit that all forums take a similar form because of 
prevalent norms in the wider political system (“institutional isomorphism”, see DiMaggio and Powell 1983), or 
that actors participate in forums due to mutually shared norms in a policy sector. Similarly, governance 
approaches would emphasize that forums per se come about as a functional requirement of horizontal 
coordination between political actors (Powell 1990). However, while insights from these theoretical strands may 
be valuable for explaining the existence of a phenomenon like policy forums per se, only an individual rational-
choice institutionalist account permits us to discriminate between the different characteristics of policy forums 
and the actors’ related individual resources and needs. 
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decisions and take the form of information costs, negotiation costs, or enforcement costs 
(Koontz and Moore Johnson 2004; Feiock 2013).  
 
Symmetric versus asymmetric games and resource exchange 
Policy forums provide collective goods to participants—often policy solutions in the sense of 
Ostrom (1990). However, we argue that collective goods are merely one type of outcome that 
can motivate actors to participate in a forum. Additionally, forum participation can also result 
in individual benefits for actors. To elaborate on both options, we distinguish between 
symmetric and asymmetric exchange.  
The typical example for a symmetric exchange producing collective goods is the one of 
fisheries management, which assumes that local users exchange concessions in their fishing 
behavior. They agree on equal or complementary usage patterns to achieve the common good 
of avoiding overfishing. All actors have the same demand—avoiding overfishing—and the 
same concessions to offer—a reduction in fishing or subordination to general rules like time 
schedules or spatial usage restrictions. As policy forums have diverse types of members, a 
symmetric exchange situation is, however, most often unlikely. In the majority of situations 
where policy forums operate, asymmetric exchange is more likely. An exchange situation is 
asymmetric if participants have different types of resources or if resources are distributed 
unequally among actors. The consequence of asymmetric exchange is that some actors might 
gain more than others from an exchange of resources within a forum. 
Resource dependence theory predicts that organizations need to exchange resources with 
others (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Thomson and Perry 2006) to achieve their goals. Whether 
actors participate in a policy forum depends on (1) what resources they require and whether 
others can satisfy their demand, and (2) what resources they have to offer and whether their 
offer satisfies other actors’ demands (Thomson and Perry 2006). For example, regular 
meetings of policy committees in corporatist arrangements can be understood as a tripartite 
exchange between trade unions, employers’ associations, and governmental actors (Molina 
and Rhodes 2002): trade unions offer willingness to comply with arrangements to employers’ 
associations and receive concessions concerning wages and labor conditions from them; and 
government receives social peace from both parties in exchange for allowing self-governance 
and providing its service as a facilitator and enforcer (Ostrom 1990). 
Another example of asymmetric exchange is a forum designed to foster exchange between 
scientists/experts, politicians, companies, journalists, and celebrities, like the World 
Economic Forum (Graz 2003). In this case, different resources are exchanged: scientists lend 
their expertise and credibility to the forum and gain visibility and reputation in return; 
politicians offer legitimacy as an “official” series of events and access to decision making 
institutions, and they gain visibility, new contacts, policy advice, and the ability to send 
signals to other politicians; companies sponsor the forum with their money for a better image 
as well as contacts to politicians and thus access to decision makers; celebrities help to 
transport other participants’ messages to a wider audience and are able to polish their own 
charity image by being included in the forum; and journalists exchange their time and a 
medium for transporting the other participants’ messages for news stories they can sell. One 
can expect some actors to gain relatively more than other actors due to the asymmetry of 
resources that are exchanged, but each participant still expects to earn more returns than he or 
she has invested, otherwise the actor would not participate in the first place. Therefore 
asymmetric exchange is not about collective goods, but rather about private goods for each 
participant (cf. Knight 1992). 
 
Multipartite coordination and interdependent goals 
In an asymmetric exchange situation, actors must coordinate to reach their goals, and one way 
to organize this exchange are policy forums. Governmental actors, for example, participate in 
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corporatist negotiation forums because failure to govern effectively would lead to their 
replacement. Trade unions participate because their legitimacy depends on successful 
bargaining for better wages (Bouwen 2004).  
Still, mutual exchange could be organized in dyadic one-shot exchanges or more 
endurable dyadic network relationships. We argue that the requirement of multipartite, 
asymmetric exchange is the reason why policy forums are founded instead of simply pursuing 
dyadic exchanges. Without the asymmetric component, forums would reduce to the subtype 
of collective action groups where all members offer the same concessions and get a public 
good. Without the multipartite component, forums would reduce to dyadic exchanges. 
However, exchanges are costly, and organizations always choose the organizational type of 
exchange that minimizes these costs while guaranteeing the same outcome. Therefore actors 
will only prefer forums if multipartite exchange is necessary.  
Multipartite exchange is defined as an exchange among more than two parties where the 
exchange cannot be disaggregated in dyadic relationships. For example, an exchange with 
four parties where A gives a1 to C, C sends c1 to A, B sends b1 to D, D returns d1 to B, and A 
trades a2 with D and gets d1 in return can be easily disaggregated into three mutual exchanges 
AC = {a1,c1}, BD = {b1,d1}, and AD = {a2,d1} in order to save the transaction costs of the forum 
with four members in excess of the dyadic exchanges with two members each. In contrast, a 
true multipartite exchange is an exchange where such a dyadic disaggregation is not feasible, 
for example when A sends a1 to B, B sends b1 to C, and C sends c1 to A. In some cases, some 
but not all exchanges can be disaggregated, for example where A sends a1 to B in return for b1, 
and C grants c1 both to A and B in return for the joint outcome {a1,b1} of the exchange between 
A and B. This corresponds to the tripartite exchange between trade unions, employers’ 
associations and the state where the state gets compliance, social peace and low-cost 
governance from the mutual exchange between the two peak associations and grants self-
governance to these parties. Based on the goals actors seek to achieve by participating, one 
can derive distinct types of policy forums.  
However, multipartite exchange—or formation of a forum—does not occur when actors 
play a zero-sum game. As forums consist of repeated interactions, actors who lose more than 
they gain on average across rounds will leave the forum. In a zero-sum game, this is by 
definition the case for at least one member of the forum (unless no actor ever realizes net 
gains, in which case formation of the forum would still be useless for any of the actors). 
 
4 Goals of actors participating in policy forums 
In the previous sections, we provided explanations of how individual incentives for 
participation in policy forums lead to a collective rationality of forum existence. However, the 
goals and expected benefits from the exchanges within a forum may differ between 
participants. Eight complementary goals of participants can be distinguished (see also Koontz 
and Moore Johnson 2004). Some of these goals might be more important for organizations 
from the public, private, scientific or societal domains. Yet, independently of these actor 
categories, there are two basic types of participants who enjoy different benefits from forum 
participation: regular participants on the one hand, and forum founders on the other. The 
distinction is important, as the latter have additional incentives like setting the agenda or 
determining who may participate.  
 
Solving policy problems 
Actors might participate in or set up a policy forum because they want to contribute to finding 
substantive solutions to policy problems. In this perspective, actors want to contribute to 
finding a solution that successfully tackles the problem at hand, reduces conflict and is 
mutually beneficial to all actors concerned with the issue. They adopt a problem-solving 
attitude, i.e., a state of mind in which they focus on long-term goals such as the creation of 
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value, better projects and a general increase in welfare (Scharpf 1988, 2006), independent of 
individual short-term policy success. This is emphasized by the literature on collaborative 
institutions and policy making (Leach et al. 2002; Thomson and Perry 2006; Lubell 
et al. 2010), adaptive (Crona and Parker 2012) or collaborative governance (Ansell and 
Gash 2008), collective action institutions (Lubell et al. 2002), or deliberative policy making 
(Choi and Robertson 2014). Independently of whether all forum participants can offer the 
same resources to others, actors contribute to the problem-solving process with their specific 
resources such as expertise or moderation of their individual preferences. This is true for 
simple participants as well as for forum founders, even though the latter might get extra credit 
for the solution of a policy problem and therefore be ready to invest more resources such as 
time or leadership. 
 
Asserting individual policy positions 
On the contrary, actors may participate in policy forums because they want to lobby for their 
own preferred solution and achieve an individual benefit independent of a good overall 
solution (Krueger 1974; Leach et al. 2002; Lubell et al. 2010). As argued above, policy 
forums with asymmetric interdependencies favor the participation of actors who pursue 
private rather than public goods because their preferred outcomes are not necessarily 
beneficial to the other participants. Forums in which actors mainly participate to defend their 
own, pre-defined preferences instead of contributing to an overall acceptable solution are also 
called “adversarial institutions” (as opposed to collaborative institutions; Lubell 
et al. 2002; Lubell 2003, 2004). Actors are willing to invest their resources as long as they can 
exchange them for a forum output close to their individually preferred solution.  
 
Legitimization 
Legitimization can mainly be pursued by forum founders. Actors might initiate policy forums 
with scientists and stakeholders in order to legitimize their political goals rather than to 
achieve real counseling or knowledge transfer. Experts are then merely part of the game 
because they are needed to justify policy making of the government or policy proposals of 
interest groups (Weingart 2006), especially regarding highly conflictual issues (Lundin and 
Öberg 2014). Busch (2009) calls this process “policy-based evidence-making.” In this 
perspective, experts do not deliver objective truth, but rather “serviceable truth”, which is “a 
state of knowledge that satisfies tests of scientific acceptability and supports reasoned 
decision making” (Jasanoff 1990; Agrawala 1999). This function of policy advice is 
emphasized in the early literature on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 1987), as 
well as on advisory committees, scientific policy advice, evidence-based policy making, and 
science and technology studies (von 
Beyme 1988; Jasanoff 1990; Agrawala 1999; Lövbrand 2007). 
The exchange in this specific situation mostly concerns experts (scientists, local 
stakeholders, etc.) and forum founders. Whereas the latter gain legitimization, they need to be 
able to offer something to the actors they use to legitimize their issue. In exchange of 
legitimization of a policy position, scientists might get visibility and reputation (see below), 
and stakeholders might benefit from agenda-setting or a favorable policy solution (see below 
and above). 
 
Visibility and reputation 
Actors may participate in forums in return for increased visibility and reputation. In this case, 
forum participation confirms that the actor is regarded as competent and important in the 
respective issue area. Scientists, for example, might get recognition from peers if they are 
selected to report on a given issue (The LSE GV314 Group 2013). An important reason why 
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actors engage or support a deliberative forum is the potential to improve their public image, or 
to avoid a negative image due to non-participation (Hendriks 2006).  
On top, founders or leaders of forums gain additional credits for setting up a policy forum 
that aims at solving a given problem. Getting public visibility and an image as entrepreneur 
and active problem-solver can be beneficial for actors vis-à-vis other actors and the public. 
For example, political parties and governmental actors can benefit from such an image, but 
also firms sometimes initiate forums which are instrumental for improving their public image. 
In terms of exchange, actors who want to benefit from forum participation in order to get 
visibility and reputation must be able to offer another resource, such as expertise or 
moderation of their policy positions. 
 
Agenda setting 
Forums can not only grant visibility to actors, but also to issues. Actors can use policy forums 
for agenda setting (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Wolfe et al. 2013), i.e., to put an issue or 
problem on the political or public agenda. Bringing an issue to public attention on behalf of a 
whole forum—including different kinds of actors—increases the pressure to discuss the issue 
and find a solution for it.  
What is more, forums are sometimes founded in order to increase the visibility of an issue 
and hence as an agenda-setting instrument. Setting up a policy forum which deals with a 
given issue is one way to show other actors and the public that the issue is worth to be dealt 
with. It is also an opportunity to frame a problem in a way that corresponds to the founder’s 
political goals. Yet, in terms of exchange, the actors interested in setting an issue on the 
agenda or framing it in a specific way by discussing the issue in a forum needs to be able to 
offer something to other forum participants. In the case of forum founders, this will most 
often be visibility.  
 
Shifting the decision making venue 
A similar phenomenon as with agenda setting has been observed with regard to venue 
shopping. This proposition was advanced by Baumgartner and Jones (1991), who argue that 
“policy losers” shift the policy venues until they have enough supporters for their preferred 
policy. Also, if a government agency prefers a certain policy outcome and is able to anticipate 
that veto players will prevent this outcome from being realized, then it may try to declare the 
policy as an issue that has to be discussed by experts from various fields and that, 
accordingly, has to be dealt with in a newly established policy forum rather than within the 
political sphere. In order to increase their chances of success, actors thus select the forum that 
maximizes their chances of transforming their preferences into policy (Pralle 2003; Lubell 
et al. 2010). Based on a negative experience with a given forum, actors might decide to 
abandon the forum if participating in alternative forums is expected to enhance the odds of 
successful goal attainment (Pralle 2003). 
 
Reduction of uncertainty and learning 
Actors dealing with a given problem usually want to learn about it (Leach et al. 2002; Berardo 
et al. 2013). Policy forums allow for the exchange of technical know-how, knowledge about 
policy options and their potential consequences (Kinzig and Starrett 2003), as well as the 
preferences of other actors (Leach et al. 2002; Leifeld and Schneider 2012). Especially 
deliberative forums are likely to foster social learning among actors (Hoppe 2011; Choi and 
Robertson 2014), or actors’ learning about citizens’ preferences (Hendriks 2005, 2006). 
Bridging or boundary organizations bring together policy makers and experts and aim at 
establishing a knowledge exchange between groups of actors with different types of 
knowledge (Cash et al. 2006; Crona and Parker 2012). Learning can also take place within 
corporatist arrangements (Öberg 2002).  
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Particularly governmental actors responsible for making policy decisions set up forums in 
order to consult stakeholders and learn about their preferences in order to make the “right” 
decision (Nagel 2006). A public manager thus has an interest in bringing together relevant 
actors in order to enhance the design as well as the implementation of policies (Feldman and 
Khademian 2007) via mutual exchange of expertise before a decision is made.  
 
Networking and trust building 
By participating in forums, actors can establish network contacts with other actors interested 
in the same issue (Leach et al. 2002; Lubell et al. 2002; Feiock and Scholz 2010; Lubell et al. 
2010). Forums serve as institutional opportunity structures for actors to develop contacts, 
cooperation and social capital (Leifeld and Schneider 2012), and thereby to reduce their 
behavioral uncertainty (Berardo et al. 2013) and create trust (Berardo 2009; Lubell 2007).  
Corporatist arrangements (Öberg 2002), boundary organizations (Hahn et al. 2006) and 
deliberative forums (Hendriks 2006) all create trust and a common understanding of given 
issues among participating actors, which facilitates a long-term dialogue (Feldman and 
Khademian 2007; Crona and Parker 2012). For example, bargaining between trade unions and 
employers’ associations relies on the experience of employers’ associations that their 
concessions indeed lead to cooperative behavior of the trade unions’ constituency. 
Beside trust—which concerns any type of actor participating in the same forum—, policy 
forums may have a connective capacity when they link actors from otherwise distinct 
organizational fields or societal spheres. The literature on boundary organizations suggests 
that actors from science and politics use policy forums as an opportunity to collaborate 
because they would otherwise hardly get in touch with each other.  
 
5 Characteristics of forums 
The potential benefits of exchanges in forums depend not only on actors’ goals, but also on 
the characteristics of forums (Feiock 2013), which vary on at least eight dimensions (see 
also Koontz and Moore Johnson 2004). For each of them, we discuss how the specific 
characteristics affect exchange processes among actors. 
 
Composition 
First, forums can differ with respect to their internal composition. Potential forum participants 
are either individuals, such as experts, or—more likely—representatives of collective actors 
such as state agencies, interest groups, political parties, private firms, local stakeholders or 
scientific organizations (Hardy and Koontz 2009). Depending on the purpose of the forum, 
different types of actors are included. For example, if the goal of a policy forum is to 
elaborate policy implementation plans, the inclusion of local actors can be important for 
figuring out whether proposed actions work in a particular context. Including the political 
domain can be important for finding out what actions are likely to be adopted and funded, or 
how to achieve political awareness of an issue. The scientific or technical domain is important 
for informing actors on what actions will solve particular problems (Feldman and 
Khademian 2007), especially with respect to highly complex and uncertain policy issues 
(McAllister et al. 2013).  
There are several ideal types with respect to composition: one ideal type involving mainly 
stakeholders and users are local forums of collaborative governance. The literature on 
collaborative institutions emphasizes the importance of inclusiveness with respect to 
stakeholders who are affected (Lubell 2003; Ansell and Gash 2008). Deliberation studies 
emphasize the importance of citizen participation for the legitimacy and the quality of 
decisions (Habermas et al. 1964; Landre and Knuth 1993; Vasseur et al. 1997; Rowe and 
Frewer 2000; Parkins 2002). Still, the risk with strong citizen participation is that it may 
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complicate the determination of public preferences and create ambiguity as to how much 
weight these inputs from citizens should be given (Steelman and Ascher 1997).  
A second ideal-type including mostly scientific experts and political actors directly 
responsible for an issue are advisory groups, boundary organizations, or bridging 
organizations (Cash et al. 2006; Gulbrandsen 2011; Crona and Parker 2012). Boundary or 
bridging organizations can include local actors, as their goal is to play an intermediary role 
and foster knowledge exchange between different arenas, levels and scales (Cash et al. 2006). 
Advisory groups usually include experts in order to solve specific problems, and 
representatives of the agencies seeking expert advice or justification.  
Finally, corporatist arrangements as a third ideal type focus on important interest groups. 
These forums are usually not inclusive, but the centralization of actors on both sides (i.e., 
unions and business) is even a pre-condition for being recognized as negotiation partners.  
Generally, including different types of actors is important for the forum to be able to 
address given issues. However, as different types of actors have different logics of 
functioning, forums with highly diverse sets of actors might have a harder time to interact and 
exchange resources or need a facilitating leader to do so (Provan and Kenis 2008, Krause and 
Douglas 2012).  
 
Size 
In general, forums are established when every participant’s welfare is increased as compared 
to non-establishment of the forum. For example, if there are eight users of a common pool 
resource, and six users have established a policy forum, the choice of whether a seventh user 
is invited to the forum depends on whether they can prevent the resource from being depleted 
without the seventh user or if the user is necessary to make a decision. In common pool 
resource settings, having all users on board usually leads to a higher chance of solving the 
dilemma (Ostrom 1990). In other settings, like corporatist forums, increasing fragmentation 
on each side would lead to less efficient outcomes. Therefore actors are organized in peak 
associations which take part in the negotiations.  
In general, there is an implicit tension between group size and the capacity of self-
governance of policy forums (Olson 1965; Feiock and Scholz 2010). As the number of actors 
participating in a forum increases, the number of potential actor relations grows 
exponentially. This increases transaction costs: The sheer number of actor relations and the 
fact that face-to-face interaction is rarer with a larger number of actors both complicate self-
governance of the forum (Provan and Kenis 2008). With a high number of forum participants, 
a central broker or leader can facilitate interactions between actors (Provan and Kenis 2008, 
see also next subsection). Further, the ideal size of a forum depends on other conditions, such 
as the diversity of participants, their goal consensus, or the expertise needed in a forum 
(Provan and Kenis 2008;Krause and Douglas 2012).  
What is more, the size of the policy forum influences the function it can adopt: whereas a 
broad group can develop networks and share information effectively, narrow groups can take 
positions on issues and act in ways broader groups cannot (Koontz and Moore Johnson 2004). 
 
Organization and leadership 
Forums differ with respect to their internal organization, which influences their capacity to 
foster exchange and to satisfy participants’ goals (Pralle 2003). At one extreme point, actors 
can simply present their preferences, negotiate, and try to find a solution without any internal 
hierarchy, rules of organizations, or specific roles of actors. In this informal setting, power 
between actors can only be balanced when sufficient time is allocated to the deliberative 
process (Choi and Robertson 2014). At the other extreme point, forums can be guided by 
strict procedural rules, formal institutions and official leaders that guide the interactions of 
participants. 
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Between these two ideal-typical extremes, there are forums in which facilitators, leaders, 
or moderators are responsible for the design of the internal decision making process (Feldman 
and Khademian 2007). The presence of a facilitating leader simplifies the collaborative 
process (Vasseur et al. 1997; Folke et al. 2005; Ansell and Gash 2008), not least because a 
leader might absorb transaction costs by providing critical resources (Emerson et al. 2012). 
For instance, the role of state actors is key to facilitating and organizing corporatist 
negotiations between labor and business (Thompson 2008; Woldendorp and Keman 2010). A 
public manager can create opportunities for participation, provide information, facilitate 
deliberation (Feldman and Khademian 2007), or speed up consensus formation (Vasseur 
et al. 1997). Last but not least, third parties can act as enforcers of agreements if they have the 
necessary formal authority and can thus additionally facilitate consensus formation 
(Ostrom 1990).  
A facilitator or leader is a forum member who enables other forum members to exchange 
resources where such an interaction would not be feasible without the facilitator. In some 
cases, this is part of the multipartite exchange; facilitating discussion or negotiation is a 
competence that is traded for other resources, such as policy goal attainment, visibility or 
legitimization. Just like “network managers” (Klijn et al. 1995), forum members can possess 
various types of resources that make them facilitators: “soft” skills like a vision or leadership 
skills, relational assets like advantageous network positions (e.g., “brokerage” positions), or 
credible formal authority that can be exerted via economic sanctions or exclusion of others 
from the forum (Klijn et al. 1995). 
 
Decision making mode 
Related to the previous point, it is of crucial importance to assess whether the forum aims at 
achieving a consensus solution, whether it allows for multiple voices, or whether a final 
decision is made by a majority decision. Most of the literature on collaborative governance 
(Ansell and Gash 2008), institutions (Lubell 2003) or policy making (Leach et al. 2002) 
emphasizes that decision making in forums should be consensus-oriented. A certain degree of 
formal rules, for example a unanimity rule for decisions, can be useful as it prevents outside 
power relations from playing out in the forum as well (Choi and Robertson 2014). Such a rule 
can also increase the procedural fairness as perceived by actors (Berardo et al. 2013). 
However, if conflict is high and/or some participants defend extreme positions, the need for 
consensus might impede successful resource exchange and actual decision making (Choi and 
Robertson 2014).  
 
Degree of transparency 
Forums can be transparent and open to public scrutiny or, alternatively, the activities of 
forums can take place “behind closed doors”. Transparency is often assumed to be a key 
characteristic for successful collaborative governance in forums (Leach et al. 2002; Ansell 
and Gash 2008), and is one of the most prominent conditions with respect to the quality of 
deliberation (Rowe and Frewer 2000; Thompson 2008; Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010).  
The advantage of transparency is that actors not participating in the forum as well as the 
general public are aware of who is taking which decision for what reasons in the forum. This 
increases the credibility and legitimacy of the forum and its outcomes (Hendriks 2006). 
Further, speakers under public observation are more likely to treat their opponents in a 
respectful way and take their arguments seriously (Thompson 2008).  
In some cases, however, the absence of a public sphere can even lead to better outcomes 
from the perspective of forum members. When deliberating and negotiating behind closed 
doors without public scrutiny, actors are under less pressure to follow their constituents’ 
demands and cannot lose their face if they have to change their positions or admit the 
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complexity of the problem (Thompson 2008; Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010). Advisory 
committees, for example, are rather working behind closed doors (Leach et al. 2002). 
What is more, increasing media coverage fosters the tension between the “logic of 
influence”, which is compromise-oriented and prevalent among the negotiators of corporatist 
organizations, and the “logic of membership”, which stresses fidelity to the objectives of their 
respective reference groups (Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Häusermann et al. 2004).  
Potential advantages of excluding the public (from the perspective of forum members, not 
democratic accountability) are realized when non-members would otherwise interfere with the 
exchange realized in the forum. For example, if a state agency and firm elites discuss 
regulatory policy instruments, the firms might want to avoid interference by trade unions who 
are not part of the forum, and the politicians who take part in the deliberations might want to 
avoid public visibility because this would inhibit policy-related learning as voters might 
punish them for inconsistent views over time in a debate. On the other hand, forum members 
may sometimes have an incentive for “venue shifting” by going public. For example, when 
opponents try to assert unpopular policies, (the threat of) going public is a bargaining 
resource. 
Advisory forums where politicians or agencies seek justification for their policies can only 
serve a legitimizing function if there is a public audience (Weingart 2006). Moreover, if a 
forum is made transparent, it is less suspicious in terms of lobbyism because lobbying usually 
takes place behind closed doors. Conversely, the initiator of a forum may want to avoid 
transparency in order to pursue lobbying activities, to avoid the criticism of merely serving a 
legitimization function, or simply to increase the quality of decisions by avoiding distractions.  
 
Compliance 
Decisions made in policy forums can be binding and enforceable, or the compliance of actors 
with forum outputs is voluntary. In the logic of venue shopping, the utility of participating in 
a forum with binding decisions versus non-binding deliberation can differ (Damro 2006). 
Contrary to adversarial institutions that rely on coercive penalties for implementation, 
collaborative institutions rely on voluntary compliance (Lubell 2003). However, the users of a 
resource can make binding contracts and designate an enforcer to overcome their collective 
action situation (Ostrom 1990).  
If forum outputs are non-binding, actors risk less if they participate in the forum—they 
can simply choose not to comply with a decision they do not agree with. However, repeated 
interaction in the forum often effectively promotes compliance in the absence of enforcement 
rules. Furthermore, if an output is non-binding, actors might be less motivated to participate 
and invest resources in the forum exchange.  
 
Specificity of the issue and time horizon 
Policy forums can serve to resolve a specific problem, or they can deal with a broader field 
(Feiock 2013). In the first case, the forum is set up in order to solve a well-defined problem 
and exists only until the problem has been solved. The literature on polycentric, adaptive, or 
collaborative governance (Lubell 2003; Scholz and Stiftel 2005; Ansell and Gash 2008) 
emphasizes that actors organize forums in a bottom-up way to specifically deal with a given 
problem.  
The second type is rather a kind of permanent standing group with a broader issue scope 
and a longer time horizon (Leach et al. 2002). When the scope is broad and there are multiple 
relations between actors, trust developed between actors dealing with a given issue facilitates 
negotiations on other issues involving the same set of actors (Feiock 2013). As a classic 
example, corporatism is defined by long-term partnerships between state, business, and labor 
that deals with several different issues in the domain of social, industrial and education policy 
(Siaroff 1999). The long-term character of the arrangements creates trust among actors 
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(Öberg 2002). Also, expert groups and advisory groups (Busch 2009) are often used as an 
“extension” of the administrative apparatus and can thus have a long-term horizon.  
The issue specificity of a forum influences the expected benefits of actors’ forum 
participation, and their participation depends on whether they rather have narrow and short-
term interests or long-term and broader interests. The literature on venue shopping 
emphasizes the importance of whether narrow or broad issues are decided upon in a forum 
(Damro 2006). Inclusiveness increases the level of perceived satisfaction; people who want to 
include a wide range of interests tend to believe some common ground can be found among 
them (Lubell et al. 2010).  
 
Exclusiveness 
Finally, a policy forum can be the exclusive venue where a given problem is tackled, or it can 
be one among several forums where actors deal with the same problem. With respect to the 
second option, the ecology of games literature (Long 1958; Dutton 1995; Lubell et al. 2010; 
Smaldino and Lubell 2011; Dutton et al. 2012) posits that actors deliberately choose to 
participate in several parallel forums according to their specific knowledge, interests, or 
strategic behavior. However, participation in multiple forums might be collectively 
dysfunctional (Smaldino and Lubell 2011) as actors have limited capacities and resources to 
invest in decision making. The literature on venue shopping 
(Pralle 2003; Damro 2006; Nagel 2006) points to the fact that multiple forums dealing with 
the same substantial problem allow actors to select the forum they favor in terms of their 
chances for success, which might be detrimental to successful overall decision making. 
Similarly, deliberative forums are often simply one among several distinct types of 
participation (Hoppe 2011). Therefore, forum exclusiveness with respect to the problem that 
is dealt with is described as one of the most important characteristics of successful 
institutional design in collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 2008). If actors can expect 
successful resource exchange in an exclusive forum, this should increase their motivation to 
participate. 
 
6 Conclusions 
“Policy forum” is an umbrella term for issue-based organizations where diverse types of 
political and societal actors repeatedly engage in multipartite exchange. The goal of this 
article is to lay the foundation of an integrated theory of policy forums. At its core, the 
existence, design and outcomes of a forum follow from the need for multipartite exchanges 
between actors. We consciously adopted a rational-choice institutionalist approach to 
understand why forums exist and why actors would participate therein. Alternatively, a 
sociological institutionalist approach would put emphasis on different explanatory factors 
such as generally accepted norms and values as the main explanatory factors.  
The elaboration of our conceptual model of policy forums is based on a broad set of 
literature. The model consists of a list of eight goals actors strive to achieve as a result of the 
multipartite exchange in policy forums, on the one hand, and a list of eight characteristics of 
policy forums which influence these exchanges, on the other. The theoretical discussion of 
this model is an important contribution to the understanding of the functioning of policy 
forums. However, we were able to only scratch at the surface of actors’ goals and forum 
characteristics, and many related implications were not developed in this paper. As such, the 
related future research agenda is broad and diverse.  
First, a logical next step is to apply this model to empirical cases in the form of qualitative 
case studies or with a comparative research design. We do not know à priori how a given 
policy forum works without examining the exchanges in detail. We suggest that researchers 
who deal with “boundary organizations”, “bridging organizations”, “policy forums”, “policy 
committees”, “collaborative institutions”, “games”, “advisory groups”, “advisory 
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committees”, “working groups”, “partnerships”, “roundtables”, “intermediary institutions” 
and similar concepts first describe the exchanges taking place within the organization and the 
properties of the organization by partitioning the forum and its members into the categories 
proposed here. Empirically, some elements, such as forum composition or size, are easy to 
assess as the information is most often available from archival sources. Most other 
characteristics, however, require either in-depth study of the respective policy sector 
(exclusiveness) or outputs (compliance, specificity), or interviews with or surveys among 
forum participants, founders or managers. By studying the dimensions discussed in this 
article, the exchanges taking place inside forums can be inferred.  
Whereas many empirically observable forums combine different characteristics discussed 
in this article, specific types of policy forums are probably more prevalent than others in some 
policy sectors or polities. For example, policy forums might be especially important in the 
environmental sector, where coordination between different sectors is crucial for the optimal 
use of scarce resources and where the interaction between scientific knowledge and policy 
making is crucial in the face of wicked problems such as climate change or the degradation of 
biodiversity. We also expect important differences across countries. There is evidence for 
different “civic epistemologies” and cultures of coordination among authorities, stakeholders 
and scientists across countries (Jasanoff 1987, 2011; Lentsch and Weingart 2011). For 
example, corporatist committees (Molina and Rhodes 2002) and comitology (Joerges and 
Neyer 1997; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008) can be found mainly in Europe while 
collaborative institutions rather exist in polities with less regulation by the state. Assessing 
these differences, and deducing some ideal-types of policy forums based on the characteristics 
we discussed in this paper, are important tasks for future research in this domain. 
Research questions that need further scholarly attention with respect to policy forums 
abound: For example, we should study the role of a policy forum in a polity, as it might 
replace more formal institutions of the political system or exist as parallel venues and thereby 
increase system redundancy and stability (Landau 1969, Klijn and Skelcher 2007). What is 
more, there are exchange or dependency relations between different types of forums, not least 
in terms of joint members. Assessing such an ecology of forums and their relations is crucial 
for understanding the political system as a whole (see also Sörensen and Torfing 2005; 
Edelenbos et al. 2010; Lubell et al. 2010; Lubell 2013).  
The research agenda on policy forums also includes important normative questions. As 
briefly touched upon in the introduction, we have to ask whether policy forums are beneficial 
or detrimental for democracy. From a democracy-theoretical perspective, are they preferable 
because civil society is involved in policy making, or are they objectionable because a 
diffusion of responsibility takes place and elected politicians can no longer be held 
accountable for policy outcomes? The view presented in this article is agnostic of these 
normative judgments; however, we have provided the right tools to evaluate forums and 
classify them. This should facilitate a comparison of policy forums across polities and time in 
order to eventually reach a conclusion in normative terms.  
Finally, research on policy forums is not only crucial in a scholarly perspective and for the 
academic understanding of the political system, but research on this topic also facilitates 
evaluations of specific policy forums from a practitioner’s perspective. If a forum was 
designed to achieve specific goals, but it does not perform well, the framework described in 
this paper can help to sort out what institutional aspects of the forum must be changed in order 
to achieve the multipartite exchanges the forum was designed for in the first place. However, 
we do not formulate general recommendations to policy makers on how to design useful and 
good forums because the latter depends on the goals actors want to pursue by founding or 
participating in a forum in the first place.  
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